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Nicole Hirt and Abdulkader Saleh Mohammad 
THE LACK OF POLITICAL SPACE OF THE ERITREAN DIASPORA 
IN THE ARAB GULF AND SUDAN: TORN BETWEEN AN 
AUTOCRATIC HOME AND AUTHORITARIAN HOSTS' 
Abstract 
One third of Eritrea's citizens live in exile, and their government uses coercion, 
intimidation, and manipulation of patriotism to maintain financial flows from the 
diaspora through a rehabilitation tax and by delegating welfare responsibilities to its 
citizens abroad. Over one million Eritreans reside in Arab states, yet, we know little 
about their attitudes towards the homeland regime. Contrary to their compatriots in 
Europe and North America, they do not have political asylum and instead depend on 
work contracts for their residence permits. This makes them vulnerable to demands of 
transnational Eritrean institutions, which issue vital documents in exchange for 
fulfillment of financial obligations. The diasporic political space is doubly restricted, 
since authoritarian host states neither permit political activities, nor do they provide 
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reliable protection from the Eritrean regime. This article explores the extent to which 
Eritreans in the Arab Gulf and Sudan can avert coercion by their home government, 
and how these states disempower diasporic contention. 
INTRODUCTION 
Eritrea has been under the rule of its un-elected President Isaias Afewerki, head 
of the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) since de facto 
independence from Ethiopia in 1991. Due to continuous armed conflicts and 
political oppression, Eritrea has turned into a diasporic country, with one third 
of its population living abroad. Flight and emigration began during the mid-
1950s and intensified during the country's struggle for independence from 
Ethiopia (1961-1991). Emigration decreased in the early years of 
independence, but a mass exodus began when the government introduced a 
mandatory national service in 2002, shortly after a border war between Eritrea 
and Ethiopia raged from 1998 to 2000. At present, approximately 5,000 
Eritreans flee every month to join the diaspora. 1 Today, over one million 
Eritreans reside and work in Arab states. In contrast to diaspora Eritreans 
living in Europe and North America, very little is known about their opinions 
and their interaction with the Eritrean regime.2 International media attention 
increasingly has focused on labor migration from Asia to the GCC states. 
However, few observers have described the plight of Ethiopian, Eritrean, and 
other East African migrants, who make up the bulk of the low-paid labor force 
as domestic workers in private homes, cattle herders on isolated farms, and 
unskilled laborers at remote construction sites. 
This article compares the Eritrean diaspora in two member states of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and Sudan. 
Sudan hosts the largest Eritrean diaspora community worldwide and has been 
a haven for Eritrean refugees since the independence struggle. Similarly, Saudi 
Arabia's labor market has attracted Eritreans for decades, and today more than 
100,000 Eritrean nationals live in the kingdom. Qatar hosts a relatively small 
but growing Eritrean community, many of whom had previously lived in 
Sudan. Contrary to their compatriots in North America and Europe, Eritreans 
in the Gulf states are regarded as labor migrants and not eligible for political 
asylum. Sudan generally grants Eritreans refugee status, but does not ensure 
their safety from intrusions by Eritrean security agents and human traffickers. 
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Beginning in 2016, Sudan deported hundreds of Eritrean nationals crossing 
Sudan en route to Libya.3 
By comparing the different control mechanisms of the Eritrean regime 
in these three states, we expose the ability of its transnational institutions to 
adjust to different political environments. Consulates, embassies, and cultural 
associations, the so-called mahbere-koms,"' serve as tools to control Eritrean 
citizens abroad. The lack of political space and social rights in these host 
countries facilitates the home regime's exploitation of its diaspora. 
In spite of occasionally deploring the exodus and blaming it on hostile 
foreign powers, the Eritrean regime has developed sophisticated strategies of 
financially exploiting its citizens abroad. This exploitation manifests as a two 
percent diaspora tax on all categories of income. Additionally, the regime relies 
on Eritreans abroad to support their relatives at home, many of whom are 
prevented from making a living as recruits of the decade-long national service. 
The tax is highly controversial among diaspora Eritreans who are split between 
supporters and opponents of President Isaias' rule.s Accordingly, the 
government makes use of different strategies to secure financial flows from all 
diaspora communities, irrespective of their political stance. 
Our analysis relies on johannes Gerschewski's analytical framework, 
which assumes that the stability of authoritarian rule rests on three pillars: 
legitimation, oppression, and co-optation.6 We find that the Eritrean regime 
draws on these mechanisms by applying strategies of coercion, intimidation, 
and manipulation of patriotic feelings to make diaspora Eritrea!lS pay either 
voluntarily or nolens volens. We demonstrate how Eritrea's transnational 
institutions attempt to legitimize the government by continuously 
indoctrinating Eritrean communities about alleged conspiracies against their 
homeland. We describe how they exercise oppression or coercion to mal,e 
Eritreans comply with their demands, and we describe mechanisms of co-
optation, such as providing education to Eritrean children in Saudi Arabia and 
Sudan.? 
Eritreans in Saudi Arabia and Qatar are particularly vulnerable 
because their residence status depends on a work contract, which is only issued 
for holders of valid passports. Eritrean diplomatic missions are in charge of 
issuing such documents, and can exert pressure on migrants to comply with 
governmental demands. In contrast, Sudan grants refugee status to Eritreans 
but does not provide a secure environment, due to the presence of Eritrean 
security networks and the activities of human trafficking networks.8 The 
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political space ofEritreans in the three states is restricted in a twofold manner: 
first, the authoritarian governments of the host states do not permit political 
and civil society organizing, and second, they do not provide reliable 
protection from Eritrea's autocratic regime. 
The article explores the extent to which diaspora Eritreans in three 
authoritarian states are subjected to the coercive activities of their home 
government, and the extent to which host state policies have been 
disempowering diasporic contention. Based on insights from Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar, we examine how the restrictive labor and residence laws of the GCC 
states contribute to the dependency of Eritrean nationals on the benevolence 
of their own government. Comparatively, we discuss the situation in Sudan, 
where Eritreans receive less pressure to secure their residence permits, yet, are 
subject to an integrated surveillance network by Eritrean security agents, 
especially in the eastern regions and in Khartoum.' Our work is informed by 
six narrative Skype interviews conducted in 2016 with Eritreans who are 
currently living or have stayed for extended periods in one of our three focus 
countries. Three interlocutors are currently living in Saudi Arabia, two in 
Sudan, and one in Qatar. They have different educational backgrounds, 
ranging from university-educated to housewives without formal education, 
and an equal male to female ratio. In addition, information was gleaned from 
numerous conversations in Eritrea's capital, Asmara, with Eritreans who had 
worked in Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and/or Qatar, and who had returned for good 
or were on temporary leave to visit their families. Collecting information from 
Eritrean labor migrants to Arab countries poses significant challenges because 
most of them are reluctant to share information with outsiders due to their 
vulnerability and fear of government surveillance. One of the authors belongs 
to the same sociocultural community as the migrants, and his familiarity with 
their living conditions and challenges facilitated access to the informants.lO 
The remainder of the article describes the origins of the Eritrean 
diaspora communities in Sudan and on the Arab Peninsula and the reasons for 
the current mass exodus from the country. We elaborate on the impact of the 
GCC states' restrictive labor laws on local Eritrean communities demonstrated 
by the examples of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and explore how the Eritrean 
regime profits from the authoritarian environment, where Eritreans are not 
entitled to refugee status. Subsequently, we analyze the situation of Eritreans 
in Sudan, where national security agents have infiltrated and exercise control 
over the main Eritrean residential areas. This is facilitated by close cross-
border ethnic affiliations and by the cooperative relationship of the Eritrean 
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and Sudanese governments. The conclusion highlights how repressive political 
environments of host states facilitate the control of citizens by autocratic 
political systems elsewhere. The authoritarian host states attempt to prevent 
migrant workers from engaging openly in political activities, however, the 
Eritrean authorities, their supporters, and regime opponents manage to engage 
in clandestine political mobilization. 
THE INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLE AND FORCED MIGRATION TO 
ARAB COUNTRIES 
Eritrea was an Italian colony from 1890 to 1941, when it came under British 
military administration. In the ensuing discussion of Eritrea's future, 
Orthodox Christians and Muslims (both roughly half of the population) were 
divided. Most Christians favored union with Ethiopia due to their cross-
border cultural bonds. On the other hand, the Muslim population feared 
marginalization under Haile Selassie's rule, which had proclaimed Orthodox 
Christianity as the state religion. Accordingly, the overwhelming majority of 
Muslims favored independence." In 1952, the UN federated the country with 
Ethiopia and in 1962, Haile Selassie annexed Eritrea. Eritrean Muslims 
witnessed exclusion and marginalization under Ethiopian occupation, and in 
1958, a group of Muslim intellectuals founded the Eritrean Liberation 
Movement (ELM) or Harakat al-Tahrir.12 In 1961, exiled politicians and 
students founded the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) in Cairo, and launched 
a thirty-year independence struggle. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front 
(EPLF) established itself as a rival movement to the ELF in the mid-1970s and 
ousted the ELF from the field in 1982 over the course of the civil war. 
The Ethiopian regime followed a scorched-earth strategy by bombing 
civilians with the aim of "drying up the pond in order to catch the fish."13 This 
caused a mass exodus of Eritreans, and diaspora communities emerged in 
Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and other countries in the Arab world. 
These diaspora communities were majority Muslim, because Eritrean refugees 
with Christian background, whose numbers increased in the 1980s, tried to 
claim asylum in Europe or North America. It is estimated that during the 
British Military Administration (1941 to 1952) and during the Federation 
(1952-1962) 14 between 20,000 and 30,000 Eritrean Muslims left the country.IS 
These numbers increased from half a million in the 1960s to one million 
during the 1970s.16 In 1994, almost 600,000 Eritreans were officially registered 
as refugees in Sudan. 17 This excludes substantial numbers of individuals who 
did not receive United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 
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support because they had settled among their ethnic communities and/or were 
able to make a living in urban areas. lS Initial attempts to repatriate the refugees 
failed, and repatriation came to a complete halt after renewed war between 
Eritrea and Ethiopia in the late 1990S19 
An estimated number of more than 150,000 Eritreans settled in Saudi 
Arabia and other Gulf States as labor migrants.211 During the independence 
struggle, many Arab countries sympathized with the ELF and considered it a 
pro-Arab movement fighting against Ethiopia. Thus, Saudi Arabia and other 
Arab countries supported the liberation movement financially and by 
facilitating residence permits for Eritreans. Although they refrained from 
signing the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention, "the Gulf countries and Saudi-
Arabia in particular, supported the Eritrean guerrillas from the 1960s to the 
1990s on an ideological basis and allowed Eritrean refugees to enter and settle 
in the oil-rich countries using migration politics as an asylum policy by 
proxy."2l The ELF was even temporarily granted the status of kafil, (personal 
sponsor) for Eritreans who wished to settle in Saudi Arabia. In addition, 
residence permits could be obtained, free of charge, from the Ministry of 
Interior upon presentation of an ELF letter recognizing the applicant as 
Eritrean.22 This generous policy facilitated the establishment of an Eritrean 
diaspora community in Saudi Arabia and other GCC states. However, the ELF 
almost exclusively arranged work contracts for female domestic workers, 
because young males were supposed to participate in the armed struggle 
instead of working abroad. Only those with family connections to the ELF 
leadership could join the Saudi labor market. 
In 1977, the EPLF held its first congress and proclaimed a policy of 
self-reliance." Consequently, it established itself as a transnational 
organization by founding mass organizations that spread the EPLF's ideology 
among the refugees and mobilized them to financially support the liberation 
struggle.24 After de facto independence in 1991, the EPLF, renamed People's 
Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDj) in 1994, took over the government 
and opened embassies in countries with a significant diaspora population, 
including most Arab countries. The new government introduced a two percent 
diaspora tax on all categories of income by Eritreans residing abroad. 
Embassies and consulates issued clearances upon payment of the tax as a 
precondition for government services, such as the issuing of birth certificates, 
the renewal of passports, and the acquisition of property inside Eritrea. 
Diplomatic missions have kept meticulous records of all payments since 
1992." Initially, most Eritreans abroad paid the tax willingly to help with the 
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reconstruction of their war-torn homeland. Contrary to Eritrean migrants in 
Europe and North America, Eritrean migrants to the Arab Peninsula have 
never had a choice in paying - their work permits depend on the possession of 
a valid passport issued by their home government, and accordingly they must 
pay the tax whether or not they support the government. 
POST-INDEPENDENCE PATTERNS OF LABOR MIGRATION TO THE 
MIDDLE EAST 
Eritrea severed its diplomatic relations with Sudan in 1994, and most Eritreans 
who had been active members or sympathizers of the former ELF were forced 
to migrate to GCC states because they could no longer rely on the support of 
the Sudanese government and UNHCR. Simultaneously, they were not 
welcomed as returnees by the Eritrean government due to their perceived 
political disloyalty, and many feared arrest in case of their voluntary return. 
In the aftermath of the devastating border war between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia, a political debate emerged. A group of high-ranking PFD) officials 
(the "G IS") challenged President Isaias Afewerki's position and demanded 
democratic reforms and elections. In turn, Isaias cracked down on reformers 
and journalists of the independent press and made them disappear behind 
bars. 26 He consolidated his rule by restraining political power to a small ruling 
elite ofPFDj cadres and military officers. 
In 2002, the president tried to revive the revolutionary spirit of the 
independence struggle among the younger generation by introducing the so-
called Warsay-Yikealo Development Campaign (WYDC), which extended the 
mandatory military and national service from eighteen months to an unlimited 
time period under the pretext of protecting national sovereignty." This 
campaign has turned into an institutionalized system of forced labor and 
systematic societal militarization that forces Eritreans of productive age to 
serve the nation for a nominal pocket money." Thus, the country has been 
turned into a state-controlled command economy with little space for 
individuals to make a living in the private sector. 
Internal criticism of this policy was violently oppressed.29 Although 
the regime has long lost its political legitimacy, life under military surveillance 
has prevented people from engaging in any form of protest. Since the 
introduction of the WYDC, hundreds of thousands of Eritreans have fled the 
country, despite shoot -to-kill orders at the borders. National service conscripts 
cannot leave legally without an exit visa, which is almost impossible to attain. 
In 2016, Ethiopia and Sudan officially hosted around 130,000 Eritreans each. 
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The numbers of registered Eritrean refugees in Sudan have decreased, while 
their numbers continue to rise in Ethiopia. In 2017, UNHCR counted 
approximately 161,000 registered Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia and 103,200 in 
Sudan.3() This phenomenon of lower registration rates of Eritrea!lS passing 
through Sudan may be explained by an increase in arrests and deportations by 
the notorious Sudanese security forces. These have increased sharply since the 
establishment of the Khartoum Process aimed at curbing migration to Europe, 
and hundreds of Eritreans have already been deported in 2017.31 Refugees now 
tend to avoid registration in the camps, instead choosing to bribe Sudanese 
officials in order to live and work secretly until they manage to continue their 
journeys towards Egypt or Libya. 
At the same time, we do not know how many Eritreans have recently 
moved to join the migrant labor force in the Arab Peninsula, but the Eritrean 
embassy in Sudan has sold thousands of passports to Eritrean refugees to 
enable them to work in the GCC states." Significantly, Eritrean embassies issue 
passports to their fugitive nationals despite considering them traitors and 
deserters of the national service. Once Eritreans enter the GCC workforce, they 
become a reliable source of income for the Eritrean state coffers. Other 
Eritrean refugees manage to secure Sudanese nationality and acquire a 
passport through ethnic ties or simply by bribing Sudanese officials. 
Most female Eritreans who reside in GCC states, including Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar, are employed as domestic workers, so-called "housemaids," 
while their male counterparts often find work in the service sector, namely in 
hotels, restaurants, shops, and supermarkets. A considerable number of them 
work as truck and taxi drivers. A minority, most of them low-skilled rural 
migrant workers who enter Saudi Arabia illegally through Yemen, are forced 
to work as animal herders in the rural areas of jazan, Abha, and Asir because 
they lack the financial resources to find a kafil. These migrant workers are 
highly vulnerable due to their isolation in remote desert towns, and they face 
psychological and physical violence as well as deprivation of basic nutrition 
and health care. They are subject to overtime work, degrading living 
conditions in the desert, and severe limitations of their personal freedoms. 
They often do not receive a regular salary, and can be deported at will if their 
labor is no longer needed." In Qatar, women mostly participate in the 
domestic work force, while a significant number of men are employed in the 
Qatari police force.34 
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THE VULNERABLE SITUATION OF ERITREAN MIGRANT WORKERS 
IN THE Gee STATES 
The labor laws of the Gee member states, among them Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
and the United Arab Emirates, are based on the kafala system, a government 
policy intended to exert total control over temporary labor migrants. The 
kafilla system is rooted in longstanding customary practice, but is also partially 
codified in the respective labor laws of the Gee states. These laws require every 
migrant worker to have a kaJiI to stay and work in a Gee state. The kaJiI may 
work either as an individual or act as the head of a company or agency." This 
system has been persistently criticized by human rights organizations for 
facilitating conditions amounting to forced, even slave-like labor. The kafil has 
the full economic and legal responsibility for the labor migrant and acts 
simultaneously as his or her employer and guarantor.36 This position includes 
far-reaching powers: workers cannot change their employer under the kafilla 
system. However, in Qatar workers can theoretically change their kafil after 
two years, but they need the consent of the original kafil, who often charges a 
significant fee 37 In addition, the kafil can prevent workers from leaving the 
country or terminate the worker's employment contract, forcing the worker to 
face deportation." 
Female Eritrean domestic workers in j eddah point out that the fate of 
Eritrean domestic workers in Saudi Arabia depends entirely on the goodwill of 
their employers who, at any time, can terminate their contracts. If workers fail 
to comply with their contracts or leave their workplace without permission, 
they must pay the cost of deportation to their horne country. This puts workers 
in a vulnerable financial situation: fined by Saudi authorities for deportation 
expenses while often owing money to relatives and the recruitment agency. 
Despite these grim prospects, many Eritrean domestic workers run 
away to escape mistreatment, sexual abuse by employers or other family 
members, and unbearable work conditions. One of the main reasons for 
running away is that the job description they received from the placement 
agent differs substantially from their actual work. Sadia describes that she was 
originally recruited as a babysitter, but she was forced to work as a cleaner and 
cook for a huge household without any experience in preparing Arab cuisine. 
She narrates: 
I was mistreated by my sponsor's wife and by her adult children. I was 
beaten regularly, until my face was swollen. I had to wake up at 
midnight to serve the family members, who used to sleep the whole 
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day and stay up the whole night. In the mornings, I had to get up early 
to do the housework, and I became completely sleepless, with no day 
off. I was not allowed to visit friends or relatives in the neighborhood.39 
Bina Fernandez confirms that domestic workers consistently complain of 
economic exploitation, including non-payment or underpayment of agreed 
wages, working beyond the hours specified in the contract without 
compensation, and coercion to work in more than one household or to do 
work not specified in the contrac!.") 
The constraints produced by the rigid kafala system have produced an 
informal parallel 'free visa' system, semi-legal but often preferred by Eritrean 
and Ethiopian migrant workers residing in the Gulf states. The 'free visa' 
system consists of a number of visas issued by state authorities to an employer 
for non-existent jobs. Consequently, the visas are sold to workers through a 
labor broker or by travel agencies involved in this business. Sponsors who 
participate in the labor visa trade often contact their employees indirectly 
through a mandub, a person responsible for contact with migrant workers and 
obtaining and renewing free visas with substantial fees. 4 ! These fees are 
proportionate to the worker's income and may be influenced by the 
benevolence of the sponsor. N alive Arabs reportedly often charge less than 
those of Sudanese, Yemeni, or Somali origin, who are making a living out of 
the 'free visa' trade." The advantage of this visa is that the workers are not tied 
to a kajll but can change their employers in case of need; the disadvantage is 
the threat of deportation if detected by police while not employed by their 
legally required kajllY 
Eritrea!lS who enter Saudi Arabia or Qatar on a visitor visa for one 
month, or on a hajj visa, may acquire the necessary iqama (residence permit) 
and employment visa with the help of a kajll with the necessary contacts at the 
immigration authority. However, it is not possible to leave the workplace 
without the consent of the kajll. Runaway female domestic workers are 
particularly at risk of detention, physical and sexual abuse, or abduction by 
other migrants such as taxi drivers, who regard thelTI as financial assets.44 
Eritreans in Saudi Arabia are particularly vulnerable because the Eritrean 
government does not protect its citizens' rights, financially exploiting them as 
long as they have work, but regarding them as traitors if they become jobless. 
Eritreans facing deportation due to a lack of appropriate papers often ask the 
Saudi authorities to send them to either Sudan or Ethiopia, because they may 
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risk punishment for national service evasion and subsequent recruitInent into 
the national army upon their return to Eritrea." 
It is not the intention of the paper to delve deeper into the widespread 
and increasingly well-documented abuse of migrant workers in the Gulf states 
in general. It is important to note, however, that Eritreans are particularly 
vulnerable to exploitation from both the repressive Eritrean regime and the 
repressive host states to which they flee. Unlike their fellow compatriots in 
Europe and North America, Eritrea!lS in the Gee states are unable to claim 
refugee status - a status that carries considerable rights and the ability to settle 
permanently in their new home. Eritreans living in Gee states are vulnerable 
due to their insecure residence status and are thus easily exploitable by both 
their sponsors and the Eritrean embassies and consulates. 
HOW THE ERITREAN REGIME EXPLOITS ITS DIASPORA IN THE Gee 
STATES 
The government has developed sophisticated mechanisms to exploit both the 
established diaspora (refugees from the former independence war) and the 
new refugees who escaped from the national service. Both groups are required 
to pay the two percent diaspora tax and to make additional donations." Strong 
transnational ties ground the relationship of the PFD j regime to its diasporic 
communities. Moreover, in the Gee states, the government flexes strong 
control mechanisms on migrant workers due to their dependence on consular 
services. Furthermore, workers face pressure to send private remittances to 
their relatives at home in the absence of sustainable income, lost to the 
prolonged national service of the breadwinners. 
Gerschewski elaborates that authoritarian regimes stabilize their rule 
by applying the three pillars of regime stability: a mix of legitimation, 
suppression, and co-optation strategies. Legitimation may be gained through 
either ideological indoctrination or good economic performance. Repression 
includes oppression and/or violence to different degrees, and co-optation 
refers to the capability to tie important political and social actors to the regime 
elite.47 To guarantee the stability of a given authoritarian system, the three 
pillars must be institutionalized. This means that citizens must have 
internalized the legitimating norms, oppositional actors are structurally 
prevented from revolting through institutionalized repression, and 
institutionalized co-optation implies a balanced interaction between the 
political elite and business and/or military elites. 
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The Eritrean regime applies these strategies not only within its borders 
but also uses its transnational structures to extend its control over diaspora 
communities. It makes use of a mix oflegitimation and co-optation strategies, 
combined with coercion and oppression to exercise control over its expatriate 
citizens through the transnational political space. The government puts 
resources in maintaining mechanisms to control the diaspora by various 
means with the aim of extracting funds, which amount to approximately one 
third of the state's budget.4s These financial flows facilitate the state's economic 
survival and the persistence of the regime. Its cultural organizations, the 
mahbere-koms, operate under the umbrella of the embassies and consulates in 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar. These community centers function as hubs of political 
mobilization: facilitating social control and extracting funds from Eritrean 
nationals during seminars, cultural events, and festivals. 
Legitimation plays a lesser role in authoritarian host states than in 
liberal democratic states, where Eritreans are widely accepted as refugees and 
can cut all ties to their home government if they wish. Comparatively, 
Eritreans living in Saudi Arabia and Qatar not only need a sponsor for a work 
permit, but also a valid passport, which must be renewed." To be eligible for 
Eritrean embassy and consulate services, Eritrean citizens need a clearance 
issued after the diaspora tax has been paid, for every year the person has spent 
abroad post independence. coD Therefore, Eritreans in Saudi Arabia and Qatar 
have no chance to withhold the payment, even if they strongly oppose the 
regime. In 2017, the situation for Eritrea!lS in Qatar became even more 
complicated amid the political feud between the Saudi Arabia-UAE coalition 
and the Qatari government. Eritrea sided with the Saudi coalition and 
downgraded diplomatic relations with Qatar, but at the time of writing Qatar 
has not voiced plans to deport foreign nationals whose home states have taken 
the opposing side in the ongoing conflict. 
To understand the reaction of the Eritrean diaspora to the regime's 
taxation, it is important to highlight the diaspora community's heterogeneous 
aspects. Eritreans abroad mirror their homeland society in division along lines 
of ethnicity, region of origin, religion, and political opinion. A substantial 
segment of the established diaspora supports the regime, despite its notorious 
human rights violations, and takes pride in paying their dues to the 
government.51 However, a growing number of Eritreans abroad oppose the 
regime because of its failed economic poliCies, strategy of societal 
militarization, and repressiveness. Regime opponents belong to either 
established opposition groups, among them supporters of the former ELF and 
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EPLF dissidents, or civil society groups. These groups emerged in the wake of 
the Arab Spring and lobby for human rights, protection of refugees, and 
regime change in Eritrea.52 Neither the political nor the civic opposition groups 
are allowed to organize in the repressive GCC states, which do not permit any 
form of political organization among expatriate communities. 53 
However, Eritrean anti-regime activists meet privately, as reported by 
our informants, Mohammed Said and Abdalla Ibrahim from Saudi -Arabia and 
Amir Ali from Qatar.54 Mohammed narrates that he has attended numerous 
meetings of diverse political opposition organizations and is an active member 
of the Lowlanders League (LL), a political movement that advocates for the 
rights of the Eritrean lowland population, most of whom are Muslims. Despite 
the restricted transnational political space, most opposition parties have 
representatives in the GCC states who meet periodically at private salons and 
clubs under the pretext of social and cultural entertainment, including 
fundraising events. At the same time, consulates and embassies attempt to 
monitor opposition meetings through their omnipresent agents. 
Mohammed is well aware that his affiliation to the LL is known to the 
Eritrean security organs. He explains: 'Tve been trying to keep in touch with 
PFDj representatives and I have never missed the cultural meetings organized 
by the local mahbere-koms. I even acted as local fund collector of the two 
percent diaspora tax in the jeddah neighborhood where I live."" His example 
demonstrates the pressure from different angles. In addition to maintaining 
good personal relations with the Eritrean government agents, he must pay the 
tax and make regular donations to secure his residence permit, which depends 
on the validity of his Eritrean passport. On the other end of the political 
spectrum, the opposition group with which he sympathizes demands financial 
contributions for social service provision NGOs in Sudanese refugee 
settlements. 
Both the embassy in Riyadh and the consulate in jeddah host mahbere-
koms that serve as meeting points for the Eritrean communities and offer 
leisure entertainment, such as bingo and card games. These centers are also 
used for seminars and celebrations, during which the communities are 
informed about the "objective situation in the homeland" where their 
contributions are needed for reconstruction and social welfare programs to 
benefit martyrs' families.56 In some cases, diaspora Eritreans were pressured 
to take part in campaigns with the aim of improving the regime's international 
reputation: reacting to the 2015 report of the UN Commission ofInquiry on 
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Human Rights in Eritrea, which recognized grave human rights violations 
perpetrated by the regime, the government initiated a petition for Eritreans 
abroad to declare that they left to seek better economic opportunities, not due 
to political repression. The Eritrean diplomatic missions easily coerced 
Eritreans residing in the Arab gulf into signing because the migrants were 
dependent on the government's goodwill. 
Those Eritreans who fail to show up regularly at their local mahbere-
kom raise the suspicion of the authorities. An informant from Jeddah who had 
returned to Asmara to visit his wife and children, was warned by local 
community officials in his family's neighborhood.57 It had come to their 
knowledge that he had failed to attend the mahbere-kom in Jeddah regularly, 
and they advised him to attend more frequently to avoid repercussions for his 
family in Asmara. The local administration (memhedar) provides families with 
coupons to buy food items from government shops such as oil, sugar, 
kerosene, and gas, and may withhold them at will. 
In addition to these coercive methods, the Eritrean consular missions 
in Saudi Arabia can co-opt Eritreans by granting their children access to 
middle and secondary education at two schools run by the Eritrean 
government in Riyadh and Jeddah, respectively. The Saudi government does 
not provide education to children of migrant workers beyond the primary 
level, and migrant communities must establish their own schools, which are 
run according to the homeland curriculum. However, obtaining access to these 
schools requires proving exceptional loyalty to the regime and making extra 
donations on the occasion of national holidays, during fund raising seminars, 
and contributing to the martyrs trust fund. They also must pay substantial 
school fees, and attendance at the consulate's cultural events and festivities is 
compulsory for students. 
Eritreans who live in Qatar are subjected to similar labor laws as in 
Saudi Arabia, which means they also require a kafil and a valid passport. 
However, there is a well-established Eritrean community in Qatar, including 
former ELF fighters who migrated to the emirate during the 1980s. This 
community is well-connected to the relevant Qatari institutions and can 
support newcomers in need. Between 2008 and 2010, there was an informal 
agreement between Qatar and Eritrea to hire domestic workers and truck 
drivers, who were needed in Qatar's bourgeoning construction industry. These 
workers were handpicked by the Eritrean authorities, who chose government 
loyalists in their thirties who had completed or were exempted from the 
  
 
The Lack afPolitical Space of the Eritrean Diaspora 115
national service. The government provided them with the necessary travel 
documents, but under the condition that they transferred sixty percent of their 
salary to their personal account at the Eritrean Housing and Commerce Bank 
in Asmara. 5R In addition, they had to pay the diaspora tax and make donations. 
According to Mohammed Osman, who witnessed these developments in 
Qatar, most of the workers could not manage to live with only forty percent of 
their salary due to the high costs of housing and consumer goods. 
Consequently, most of them fled to Kenya, Sudan, or Ethiopia because they 
feared returning to Eritrea would mean military conscription or 
itnprisonment. 
Beyond that, the Eritrean regime exploits the diaspora's feeling of 
moral obligation to support their relatives at home. The government does not 
provide any social security networks, and Eritreans trapped in the national 
service are unable to sustain their families. This increases pressure on the 
diaspora to send substantial private remittances to guarantee the survival of 
their extended families. Hence, Eritreans residing in the Arab gulf are under 
multiple pressures, not only from the repressive kafala system, but also from 
their own government and their relatives at home, who expect financial 
support to survive. Few Eritreans who are forced to live under such 
circumstances find the passion and energy to engage in clandestine political 
movements to improve the situation in their homeland. They live sandwiched 
between the demands of an autocratic home regime and an authoritarian host, 
with no potential for political expression except for showing support to the 
regilne. 
THE LONG ARM OF THE ERITREAN REGIME IN SUDAN 
Historically, Sudan had been a support center of the Eritrean resistance against 
Ethiopian domination. The ELM was founded on Sudanese soil in the 1950s 
and Sudan served as retreat area for both ELF and EPLF during the liberation 
struggle. Nonetheless, the Isaias government severed diplomatic relations in 
1994 due to alleged Islamist infiltration efforts, but relations between the two 
regimes resumed in 2005 and have remained relatively cordial since. Eritrean 
security forces enjoy unhindered access to the eastern states of Sudan and have 
systematically infiltrated the cities Kassala, Port Sudan, Gedaref, and the 
surrounding areas with informants, among them members of the Beja 
community, and bribed Sudanese agents. Eritrea's secret service monitors all 
movements ofEritreans residing in these areas. 59 
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Eritrean communities in Sudan differ in various regards, such as 
duration of stay, ethnic and religious affiliation, and social status. The first 
group is the established diaspora, which has existed in Sudan for up to sixty 
years. A substantial number of these long-term residents have Sudanese 
nationality or enjoy dual citizenship-either through bribing Sudanese 
officials or because they belong to ethnic groups with cross-border affiliations 
such as the Beja and Tigre, which allows them to claim both nationalities.'" 
The second significant group of long-term refugees have remained in 
refugee settlements since their flight during the independence struggle, mostly 
those who lack cross-border ethnic networks. Over 100,000 Eritreans are 
registered as refugees with UNHCR and live in settlements in eastern Sudan, 
most of them in close vicinity to the Eritrean border. This group consists 
mostly of marginalized pastoralists and female-headed households living 
under dire economic circumstances. A majority have lived in this region for 
decades or have grown up in Sudan as second or third-generation refugees, but 
are still considered Eritrean nationals. 
The final group consists of newly arriving younger refugees, who are 
fleeing Eritrea by the thousands every month to evade the national service, 
including large groups of unaccompanied minors. The majority of them plan 
to continue their journeys northwards through the Sahara Desert to Libya or 
Egypt, with Europe as their intended final destination. However, only a small 
segment of them reach European shores. Upon their arrival in Sudan, some 
register at the refugee camps and stay for a few months until they receive a 
document confirming their refugee status." Subsequently, they move on to the 
larger cities in the hopes of earning enough money to continue their journey 
towards Europe or other Middle Eastern countries. Some of the new arrivals 
hide in the large cities, if necessary bribing Sudanese police and security 
officers to stay outside of the refugee settlements until they manage to continue 
their journey with the help of smugglers. This group benefits from the large 
informal labor markets run by well-established Eritreans in Khartoum, 
Omdurman, Kassala, and Port Sudan. 
The Eritrean government applies various methods to make Eritreans 
in Sudan contribute financially and to indoctrinate the communities 
ideologically, namely a mix of control and repression, co-optation, and 
legitimization. It runs schools, women's and youth organizations, and 
mahbere-kams in Eritrean-inhabited cities and towns with the permission of 
the Sudanese government. The embassy in Khartoum and the consulate in 
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Kassala are charged with collecting the tax by coercion: many Eritreans in 
Sudan still have property in Eritrea or want to visit their families, which makes 
them likely to pay the levy. The Eritrean government agents also exert social 
pressure on the long-term residents to attend cultural events, concerts, and 
political seminars, no matter if they live in cities, towns, or refugee settlements. 
In recent years, newly arriving refugees from Eritrea have been able to 
buy a passport at the embassy in Khartoum in exchange for signing a letter of 
regret. In this letter refugees admit to being guilty of treason by evading the 
national service and pledge to pay the tax and accept any punishment upon 
their return to Eritrea. Many Eritreans who acquired a passport after signing 
this letter have moved on to the GCC states for higher-paying opportunities 
after buying a 'free visa' from agencies in Sudan. Similarly, many second-
generation refugees have managed to migrate to GCC states after acquiring 
Sudanese citizenship or paying a high fee for a passport from Eritrea's 
diplomatic missions in Sudan. A number of these refugees use passports 
acquired from the embassy or from Sudanese authorities to enter Egypt legally, 
where they register at the local UNHCR offices and apply for resettlement. 
Some obtain domestic work after getting refugee status.62 
Eritreans in Sudan have easier access to local labor markets than their 
compatriots in the Gulf States, because they do not need a kafil. On the other 
hand, there is a strong Eritrean national security presence on Sudanese soil, 
which prevents political activities directed against the Eritrean government. 
Known opposition figures are at risk of abduction by either Eritrean security 
personnel or Sudanese officials acting on behalf of the Eritrean government. 
jamal Osman Hamid, a journalist running the opposition website Adoulis 
from Sudan was arrested in 2011, shortly after a visit of President Isaias to his 
Sudanese counterpart, Omar al-Bashir. Reporters without Borders stated that 
300 Eritreans had been expelled to their home country during the same year 
without UNHCR intervention." Reports about deportations have regularly 
appeared in the media since 2015,64 and in early 2016, Sudanese authorities 
arrested two elderly Eritrean ELF veterans." Accordingly, there is a climate of 
fear and uncertainty in Sudan that reflects the oppressive atmosphere of the 
homeland: no one feels secure if he or she refuses to abide by the demands of 
the regime. Most groups refrain from open involvement in anti-government 
activities and grudgingly attend the PFDj festivals and fundraising seminars in 
Sudanese cities. Their agency is limited to clandestine political mobilization 
under the cover of charity organizations in refugee settlements. 
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Even Eritreans with a relatively secure residence status fear the 
Eritrean security apparatus. Magnus Treiber interviewed an Eritrean military 
commander who deserted and lived in Khartoum as a refugee. His words 
impressively describe the insecurity felt by many Eritreans, whether or not the 
perceived danger of deportation is legitimate: 
We are always full of fear. In the mind you are not free. We can't do 
anything, we're just afraid. Secondly, if! go to Eritrea [in case of arrest] 
what is going to happen to my family? What is going to happen if! am 
deported? What is going to happen if they find me anywhere if I am 
alone? Yes, I am afraid. Ah, thank God ... I still don't face any charges, 
but in my mind I am not free. I am living in fear." 
CONCLUSION 
This article provides background information about diaspora Eritreans whose 
living conditions have hardly been investigated by scholars of transnationalism 
or diaspora studies. It compares the living conditions and the political space of 
Eritreans residing in the GCC states of Saudi Arabia and Qatar and in Sudan. 
Based on Gerschewski's assumption that authoritarian regime stability rests on 
three pillars, we have analyzed the Eritrean government's strategies to extract 
considerable funds from its citizens abroad through applying mechanisms 
based on legititnation, coercion, and co-optation. 
The regime attempts to maintain its legitimacy by portraying Eritrea 
as a heroic state, withstanding all types of international conspiracies, in order 
to justify the financial obligations imposed on Eritrea!lS abroad. To control its 
emigrant population, the Eritrean regime has developed a surveillance system 
disguised under the umbrella of cultural community centers. Some citizens are 
co-opted by social services, such as education through expatriate schools. 
Unlike diaspora Eritreans in democratic countries, who are protected by their 
secure refugee status, their compatriots in GCC states are forced to pay tax to 
the regime to keep their legal residence status, which depends on a valid 
passport issued by the homeland authorities. Eritreans in Sudan are under less 
pressure in this respect, because most are registered refugees with UNHCR, or 
enjoy dual citizenship. However, Eritrea!lS in both regions suffer from the lack 
of democracy in their respective host countries, which severely limit their 
political space. The authoritarian governments of the GCC states do not 
permit any open form of political activity, whether in regard to labor rights or 
in opposition to the home government. Sudanese authorities, on the other 
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hand, are cooperating with Eritrean security forces, which have established a 
close-knit surveillance system in the eastern regions and in Khartoum. They 
have been involved in the arrest and deportation of politically active Eritreans, 
which makes political activity extremely risky. Even apolitical Eritreans live 
under conditions of insecurity, mistrust, and fear. Therefore, many of them 
choose to attend pro-government meetings and festivals and pay the diaspora 
tax to avoid suspicion from government agents. Clandestine meetings 
constitute the transnational political space available to diaspora Eritreans for 
discussing the situation in their homeland. 
In smTI, the PFDJ government exercises stronger control over 
Eritreans in the GCC states and in Sudan compared to those residing in Europe 
and North America. Eritreans in the Arab gulf live under the pressure of two 
repressive systems, that of their host country and that of the transnational 
Eritrean polity. This has efficiently muted their voices to the extent that very 
little is known about the lives and political struggles of these communities, 
which make up more than half of Eritrea's diaspora population. 
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